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It is widely believed that we are witnessing some profound changes 
concerning the organisation and delivery of expertise in advanced societies.  If, as is 
claimed, knowledge, as opposed to land, capital or labour, is now the key factor of 
production, the general question of the organisation of expertise could hardly be 
regarded as being of more importance. However, it is arguably also the case that many 
predictions and claims have been incautiously made in this context, and have typically 
greatly exceeded the information available to support them.  At some point there has 
to be careful consideration of how far there is empirical support for some of the 
different theoretical contentions.  There is extended controversy, for example, about 
the continued importance of the professions, and the extent to which the traditional 
patterns of organisation and governance continue to be viable; and while some 
extreme claims have been made of the imminent demise of the traditional professional 
and its associated patterns of organisation, systematic consideration of the evidence 
has often been lacking.  
 This paper is concerned with the question of how to describe and explain the 
changes taking place in a small corner of this field, which concerns the extent to 
which and the ways in which the traditional professions are reorganising themselves. 
If the general claim of the collapse of professionalism is seen to be implausible, then 
commentators have often claimed that, at the very least, there will have to be 
fundamental changes in the pattern of organisation away from control of their 
businesses by professionals themselves towards more managed patterns of provision. 
This paper takes as its point of departure some of the recent work of Pinnington and 
Morris (2003), in which they present data concerning the organisation of large English 
Law firms. Through a consideration of their data, Pinnington and Morris raise some 
questions about the actual patterns of change taking place amongst solicitor firms and 
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through this, they question the appropriateness of archetype theory for the analysis of 
contemporary change in this branch of the legal profession.  
In this paper, we bring forward data of a different type that nonetheless can be 
brought to bear on similar research questions to those addressed by Pinnington and 
Morris. These concern the extent to which solicitors have become subject to 
managerial rather than the traditional modes of organisation and control associated 
with professional patterns of organisation.  Whereas Pinnington and Morris’s data are 
derived from a sample survey, and to a considerable extent report the views and 
opinions of respondents, our data are largely drawn from the facts and figures 
returned by legal firms to the Law Society.  It therefore relates to the population of 
solicitor firms in England and Wales, and is a reliable basis for generalisation. It also 
allows some connections to be made between different patterns of organisation and 
levels of financial performance, the need for which has been widely acknowledged. 
We believe our data allow us to describe, with a great deal of certainty, the processes 
of structural transformation that have occurred and are occurring in the organisation 
of the contemporary legal profession. In addition, as we shall argue towards the end of 
our paper, the data allow us to develop a different account of structural change in the 
organisation of solicitor firms which uses different theoretical assumptions from 
archetype theory. 
This paper has two main sections. In the first section, which is mainly 
concerned with the presentation of data, we describe changes to the pattern of 
organisation found in solicitor firms over a ten-year period. In the second section, we 
pass on to the consideration of ideas that best account for the changes we have 
discussed. We argue that, although there is evidence for considerable change, it is 
easy to exaggerate the extent of change in the basic organisational forms of solicitor 
firms, and particularly the extent to which they conform to entirely new patterns of 
organisation. We find little evidence for a move away from traditional forms of 
organisation, in which legal services are organised and delivered by solicitors 
themselves. This is against the ideas that have been developed by archetype theorists 
(Greenwood et al 1990; Greenwood and Hinings 1993; Brook et al 1999; Cooper et al 
1996), whose convictions Pinnington and Morris were concerned to test.  Pinnington 
and Morris themselves, correctly (in our view) argue for considerable continuity 
alongside change.  This is a finding we will confirm. 
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Although our data also suggests both continuity and change, we think that the 
evidence points more towards continuity than believed by other commentators. We 
argue that it is with regard to the size of solicitor firms, and some marginal changes in 
the pattern of the internal division of labour, that we have the most noticeable 
changes. The largest solicitor firms have become, by historical standards, very large 
indeed.  Large solicitor firms might be expected to have developed new practices and, 
in particular, new modes of coordination.  As is widely proposed by organisational 
writers, and as commonsense reasoning confirms, larger firms pose more problems of 
co-ordination, and can also afford to sustain employees who contribute to this rather 
than to the production of goods and services.  Our data certainly support the 
contention change has moved furthest amongst the largest firms.  However, even 
there, the evidence of fundamental change is weak.  We shall argue that it is true that, 
amongst large firms, there have been some moves towards the use of more 
management practices and techniques.  But there remains room for considerable 
scepticism about the extent to which we can identify a new managed form of 
organisation, which archetype theorists call the managed professional business 
(MPB), is actually present. We think the evidence for the existence of the MPB is 
negligible if this is taken to suggest that the control of solicitor firms has moved out 




Until recently, contributions have endorsed the applicability of archetype 
theory to a wide range of professional organisations in both the public and the private 
sectors (Cooper et al 1996; Brock et al 1999; Kitchener 1998, 1999; Ferlie and 
Fitzgerald, 2000; Dent et al., 2001; Pinnington and Morris 2001; Pinnington and 
Morris 2003). According to the exponents of this approach, environmental 
contingencies are dictating processes of paradigmatic shift, whereby professional 
organisations are abandoning the orthodox professional archetype (which they call, 
P2).  Orthodox professional firms (P2’s) are supposedly based on traditional notions 
of partnership, collegiality and universal service. While it is questionable whether 
solicitor firms were anything but intensely commercial in orientation (Sugarman, 
1993), archetype theorists suggests they are now reconfiguring themselves as 
M.P.B’s; among other things, placing more emphasis on managerialism, bureaucracy 
and commercialism (Cooper et al 1996).  Change, in this context, is seen as an 
 4
essentially functional process. A better and more efficient way of organising and 
executing activities has been discovered in the MPB, and since organisations are 
committed towards improving efficiency, competitiveness and performance levels, 
this is inevitably implemented. The neo-functionalist and contingency theory 
assumptions behind such work are clear.  
 Currently, the relevancy of archetype theory is being questioned in a number 
of ways. Pinnington and Morris question the applicability of archetype theory to the 
organisation of architecture practices (2001), and continue to do so in their study of 
solicitors (2003). Similarly, Finn et al (2003), raise some strong doubts on its 
empirical and methodological reliability. However, both sets of authors, despite 
suggesting scepticism, are clearly equivocal about the theoretical value of this theory; 
they do not reject it, leaving in doubt the question of the extent of the applicability of 
the approach. By contrast, in this paper, we argue that archetype theory is 
theoretically so questionable it should be rejected. (See also Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd, 
2003.) As an alternative, we propose theoretical ideas that feature the agency of 
professional groups and other actors much more centrally, and which suggest that 
organisational forms are the outcomes of the negotiations between groups, rather than, 
as archetype theory holds, that they exist because they are functional.   
 Central to our theoretical endeavour is the notion of professional project 
(Larson 1977), which focuses on the attempts by professional groups to translate a 
scarce set of cultural and technical resources into a stable and institutionalised system 
of rewards. In our account, organisational change in solicitor firms is connected with 
the agency of professional elites (partners controlling practices) and their strategies 
which are designed to safeguard and promote their interests. Accordingly, this 
contribution links what change there is in professional organisations, to the continued 
pursuit of the long-term objectives of the professional project. It is argued that the 
current change in the organisation of the legal profession is not explained by the 
identification and adoption of a better and more effective organisational paradigm; 
rather, ongoing changes are better explained as a continuation of the control of law 
firms by the professional elite. Change is initiated and developed by identifiable 
groups within profession itself. We argue that, having substantially lost external 
closure (control of the numbers entering the profession), the elite of the profession is 
nonetheless able to preserve professional privileges by, among other things, increased 
specialisation in, and ability to claim superior expertise concerning, lucrative areas of 
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legal business. Such a strategy lies behind the increasing size of firms.  Crucially, 
however, they also have seen the value of exercising internal closure on the numbers 
becoming equity partners in solicitor firms and so gaining access to a proportionate 
share of the profits of professional practice.  
As a result of these activities professional hierarchies have become elongated, 
and the terms and conditions of career progression are changing in favour of those at 
the top of professional hierarchies and against those at the bottom. As corporations 
allegedly flatten their structures, solicitor firms are moving in the opposite direction, 
towards more internal differentiation and hierarchy. Nonetheless, the centrality of 
professional expertise to service provision, remains. In this view, any increased use of 
management is not central to the processes that are occurring and increased use 
management techniques is only an adjunct to processes of internal change. Thus, 
professional change is thought about as predominantly, but not exclusively, as a 
political as opposed to a functional process. The emphasis in archetype theory, on 






(a) An Overview of Change in Solicitor Firms 
 
Pinnington and Morris deliberately limit their attention to large firms, and there is, as 
we have said, some point in this. If the purpose of research is to focus on change, the 
concern for large firms is justified. But it also runs the risk of emphasising change 
over continuity.  We think similar changes are affecting solicitor firms of all sizes, it 
is just that the key trends are especially marked with large firms. 
Traditionally, solicitor firms have been very small, and this remains true for 
the great majority of firms today. In 1802, the average law firm had 1.2 partners. By 
1902 this figure had risen to only 2.5. (Sugarman 1993; 1996).  By that date, 75% of 
all firms had less than four partners and 92% had fewer than six (Abel 1988). 
Significant law firms with no more than two partners were not unusual (Sugarman 
1992; Slinn 1974, 1987). To give an indication of this situation, as late as in 1937, 
Linklaters, the biggest law firm in the country, contained only eleven partners. (Slinn 
1987). As late as in the early 60s, legal practice equalled sole practice or partnership 
with a few others, usually family members (Sugarman 1993; 1996). The situation has 
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evolved since. Whilst today, 83.2% of all firms employ 4 partners or less (and 94% 
have less than 10 partners), small partnerships currently account for less than a third 
of all solicitors in private practice.  
In this context, it is the development of very large solicitor firms in the last 
twenty years that compels attention, and, as they have grown, they have employed an 
increasing proportion of all solicitors.  For many years, of course, the size of 
partnerships was limited by legislation. Under English law, the maximum number of 
members of a partnership was 20. However, for a long period of history this was an 
entirely theoretical limitation, which was not approached. Linklaters and Paines, the 
largest British law firm in the nineteenth century, never exceeded four partners; while 
Freshfield, one of the oldest law firms and the solicitors of the bank of England, for 
decades never exceeded three.  The first firm to reach the quota of 20 partners was 
Slaughter and May, which occurred as late as 1961 (Abel 1988). The limit on 
partnership members was lifted for solicitors soon after, in 1967. However, size 
remained limited until the early nineteen eighties. Indeed, it is only in the past 15 
years that we have witnessed the huge growth in the size of large legal practices.  
Table 1:  Solicitors in Legal Firms of Different Sizes, 1989 – 2000 
 
  1989 1990  1994 1995  1999 2000 








































































































































Unless otherwise indicated, data are drawn from the Law Society’s Regis Database, and annually 
published in Trends in The Legal Profession: Annual Statistical Report, by the Law Society Strategic 
Research Unit  
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Table 1 gives a breakdown of the change in the size of solicitor firms, as 
measured by the numbers of solicitors employed during the 1990’s. This shows that 
the proportion of qualified solicitors working in small firms has been declining. 
Something similar is true for medium sized firms, only here the decline is more 
marked. Significant growth in the numbers of solicitors at work has been concentrated 
among the very largest firms, as we shall now see. 
The last 15 years, particularly, has seen a substantial growth in the size of the 
largest legal practices and the proportion of the total of qualified solicitors who work 
in them. Clearly, this involves a substantial increase in the concentration of the 
profession from a very low base. Since the mid 80s the size of the average law firm, 
as measured by the number of solicitors, has increased by 55% whilst doubling from 
its mid 70s levels.  In 2001, the average law firm employed just over 8 solicitors. The 
legal profession is becoming increasingly concentrated in larger productive units. 
 
 
(b)  The Concentration of Legal Practice 
 
Today, over a third of all solicitors (36%) work for very large firms, ie those 
that are defined here as firms having more than 25 partners. These organisations have 
an average headcount of over 500 employees. Over the last 10 years this occupational 
segment has expanded by 57%. An additional 16% work for large practices, 
employing 11 partners or more and a total headcount of over 100 staff members. Over 
half of the profession is, therefore, employed in what are by historical standards very 
large organisations. This emerges clearly if we consider that the European definition 
of a SME is of an organization employing less than 50 employees. In terms of the 
utilisation of skilled manpower, the legal profession in England and Wales is 
becoming dominated by large organisations. 
At the top end of the size distribution, there are some very large legal players 
indeed. Today, the largest of British legal firms can be accurately described as  
‘multinational law factories’, which employ thousands of salaried legal and support 
staff throughout a network of offices across the five continents (Hanlon 1997; Hanlon 
1999; Abel 1988). Clifford Chance, Eversheds, Slaughter and May, Allen & Overy, 
Freshfield and Linklaters are true global giants, employing thousands of solicitors and 
hundreds of partners across the globe, monopolising entire practice areas and 
generating hundreds of millions of pounds of revenues. Clifford Chance, which is the 
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biggest law firm in the world, employs 7500 staff in 33 international offices, including 
650 partners and 3700 associates and trainees (Clifford chance web-site). This firm 
generates revenues of almost £1 billion. These multi-nationals are of course untypical 
of the developments we are considering here, and are outliers to the trends under 
examination. 
 
(c)The Bureaucraticisation of Legal Practice? 
 
Should the unprecedented growth in the size of legal firms be thought of as 
constituting evidence of the legal profession’s development of managerial values, 
structures and practices?  A substantial increase in size is often taken to imply the 
introduction of an increasingly bureaucratic structure and a managerial apparatus 
(Mintzberg, 1979, 1983; Chandler 1977, 1990), which is an essential requirement for 
the effective organization and co-ordination of resources and the rational 
administration of assets. Organisational consolidation is held to be a prerequisite of 
increased managerialism, but does increased managerialism automatically follow 
from increased size?  At a minimum, enlarged firms might be expected to employ a 
substantially higher proportion of staff who are removed from operational work and 
exclusively concerned with management, organisation and technical support (Freidson 
2001; Freidson 1994). Accordingly, the analysis of fluctuations in the ratio of 
professionally qualified to non fee-earning staff should provide us with some 
indications of development.  
The following graph illustrates how, contrary to our expectations, the ratio of  
administrative and support staff to professionals has experienced a significant 
deterioration. Today, professionals constitute 40% of the industry’s entire workforce. 
Although, this is still a minority, they have progressed from the early 90s when 
qualified solicitors constituted barely 30% of the entire workforce. The ratio of 
solicitors to non-fee earning staff has therefore increased from 0.45:1 in 1985 to 
0.63:1 in 2000. This represents a 40% increase in the concentration of lawyers to 
administrative and managerial staff. 
Moreover, these trends are not distorted by the presence of smaller practices, 
which, due to their limited size, can be expected to retain a less extensive supporting 
staff and operate with a smaller managerial apparatus whilst those at the top of the 
professional size spectrum can bureaucratise and managerialise at a much more rapid 
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pace.  However, it appears that very large practices, if anything, employ a higher ratio 
of professionals to support workers, and hence, have pro-rata less support staff than 
any other category of firm. The average large partnership functions on a ratio of 0.71 
solicitors to each non-fee earning staff (SRU 2002). This represents a 14% premium 
on the professional average of 0.63:1 and respectively a 22% and 33% advantage on 
small and medium sized partnerships (SRU 2002). 
 























































Accordingly, very large practices, which we would expect in light of the 
previous observations, to be further down the path towards managerialism, seem to be 
able to operate with less support staff and larger operating cores than the rest of the 
profession.  This situation implies that in the legal profession, organisational 
consolidation, contrary to our expectations, has not been followed by one of the usual 
developments associated with managerialism: the development of larger cadres of 
dedicated managerial, administrative and supportive personnel. This is confirmed by 
the next graph, which indicates how in solicitor firms it seems, support staff and not 
the ‘operating core’ of solicitors are the main source of numerical and labour costs 
flexibility.  
Our data suggests that adjustments to this category of staff tends to follow 
fluctuations in the business cycle, being contracted during slowdowns in business and 
then expanded again during upturns. By contrast, the operating core of qualified 
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solicitors has generally experienced more limited and less immediate headcount 
adjustments as well as benefiting, regardless of the realities of the business cycle, 
from a much more stable expansion (+42%).  
 








Admin Solicitors Gross fees
Admin 0.063 -0.005 -0.006 -0.023 -0.047 -0.007 -0.097 0.109 0.029 0.013 0.036 0.024
Solicitors 0.042 0.035 0.013 0.021 0.025 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.05 0.032 0.034 0.056






























(d) Reconstructing the Professional Division of Labour 
 
 
Our consideration of the evidence suggests that, whilst the supporting, administrative 
and secretarial staff of solicitor firms have experienced headcount adjustments 
following fluctuations in financial performance, the utilisation of qualified solicitors 
has grown despite economic slowdown.  Thus, the size of the ‘operating core’ of 
qualified solicitors for all firms has continued to expand.  This is, of course, at odds 
with the ideas of organisational analysts concerning patterns of organisational 
transformation. Efficiency and competitiveness considerations usually dictate that 
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management adjusts productive capacity to fluctuating demand. In times of financial 
difficulty, it is productive capacity that becomes the first area subjected to cost 
cutting, because this cuts production (and therefore costs) directly in line with falling 
demand.  
In both financial and operational terms, this logic, could be applied to the 
professions too. Professional labour costs are by far the biggest overhead facing 
professional organisations. Idle professionals are expensive overhead. Accordingly, 
reductions in the operating core headcount would deliver the most sizeable and the 
most immediate benefits. However, quite obviously, professions differ from 
manufacturing or commercial firms in key ways. One is that professionals do not just 
produce, they also design their service to the particular needs of clients and their 
particular circumstances. The extent to which what they do can be designed and 
rationalised or controlled is limited.  Also, the professional operating core is not only 
important for production, but also dominates decision-making processes and retains 
ultimate control over occupational and organisational development (Freidson 2001; 
Mintzberg 1983; Mintzberg 1979).  
 There have, however, been some considerable changes to the constitution of 
the cadre of professionals.  If we consider the change to the profession’s internal 
structure and to the nature of intra-professional relationships, some important changes 
are revealed. As we can see from the next graph, there has been a continuous rise in 
the proportion of associates relative to partners, with the relevant ratio moving from 
from the 1985-86 value of 0.5, or 1 associate for every 2 partners, to a 2000-01 ratio 
of over 1:1. This is an 110% decline in the underlying ratio. Bearing in mind that the 
partner figure includes junior partners, the ratio of professionally qualified wage 
earners to profit sharing staff is even higher. There has, in other words, been a strong 
long-term tendency towards increasing the proportion of salaried professionals to 
partners. This, as indicated by our next graph, emerges clearly from the comparison of 
the relevant headcount growth rates.    
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(e)  The Profitability of Firms  
 
Pinnington and Morris suggest it is a considerable defect of existing research, that it 
cannot make connections between structural change and financial performance. This 
section addresses this problem through the consideration of gross fees patterns across 
size categories. The data indicate that the larger firms, which benefit from the 
advantages of organisational consolidation, enjoy a sizeable performance and 
productivity premium compared to smaller firms.  
 
This graph indicates percentile variations in gross fees per firm. Very large firms with 
an overall growth of 40% are the best performers. These firms are followed by large 
firms and medium firms which both exceeded the 20% mark. Small firms expanded 
by 16.5%, whilst, with a percentage growth of 4.5%, sole practitioners are by far the 
worst performers. Very large firms have therefore been growing 60% faster than the 
second-best performers and nearly nine times faster than the worst performers. This 
situation gives the impression of a growing process of professional polarisation, in 




On this evidence, performance is directly proportional to size, as indicated by the 
positive correlation between organisational consolidation and revenue growth 
performance. 
















Sole practitioners 2-4 Partners 5-10 Partners 11-25 Partners 25+ Partners
 
Similar indications emerge from the following graph, which depicts the relationship 
between qualified headcount and gross fee gereration 


















Sole Practitioner 2-4 Partners 5-10 Partners 11-25 Partners 26+ Partners






The above graph suggests that the gross fee levels, generated by smaller practices, 
substantially under-perform given their share of professional headcount whilst larger 
practices are able to achieve better returns per unit of professional resource. Sole 
practitioners, despite accounting for 9% of professional headcount, produce only 5% 
of total revenues. Similarly, small partnerships, despite a 22% share of professional 
headcount, account for only 16% of professional fees. However, as we progress 
through the size spectrum, the situation starts to improve and fee and headcount 
shares start to converge. Firms with 15 – 25 partners account for an equal share of 
revenues and professional headcount. In other words, the financial significance of this 
segment is proportionate with its size. Finally, as we progress to very large firms, the 
situation is completely reversed. This time, this category’s contribution to overall fees 
(50%) outstrips its respective share of professional headcount (35%), by a 43% 
premium. Clearly, the relationship between these two indicators reflects the existence 
of an efficiency and competitiveness differential. As firms get larger, they are 
increasingly capable of improving the volume of fees generated by each professional, 
hence increasing their share of fees relative to their share of manpower. There is, in 
other words, a strong positive correlation between organisational size, professional 
productivity and financial performance, whereby lawyers employed in large practices 
attain higher levels of individual productivity and generate more pro capita revenues 
than their colleagues working for smaller firms. This as indicated by table 2, which 
allows the comparison of gross fees per capita for different sizes of firm. 
  
 




Practitioner 2-4 Partners 5-10 Partners 11-25 Partners 26+ Partners 
£103,000 £116,000 £132,000 £163,000 £229,000 
 
 
As we can see, the larger the firm for which a solicitor works the larger are his/her pro 
capita revenues. Moreover, at the bottom of the chart there is in monetary terms a 
limited differential between size-bands, as only a 12.5% financial divide separates 
sole practitioners from their colleagues in small partnerships, whilst 14% separates 
this latter category from medium sized law firms. However, this differential increases 
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progressively with size. A 23.5% differential separates medium firms from large firms 
whilst a massive 40% separates large firms from their colleagues working in very 
large practices.  Even more dramatically, solicitors working for very large practices 





(a)  Explaining the Size Premium 
 
It is of course possible that larger firms are more efficient because they can employ 
managers and / or utilise management techniques, as exponents of the idea of the 
MPB implies.  However, size delivers advantages, such as economies of scale, 
independently of any role management may have in identifying and supplying them.  
Thus, we have no problem with the idea that the utilisation of more efficient methods 
is part of the explanation for the size premium we have identified. For example, a 
recent study by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2000) suggests that very large law firms 
(50+ partners) are able to spend nearly twice as much, in per capita terms, on 
information technology, as their smaller counterparts (£4000 against £2500) (PWC, 
2000). Similarly, large firms spend more on marketing, (£4000 per capita) as their 
smaller rivals (£2000 per capita) (PWC, 2000).  Similar economies of scale are 
possible in such diverse areas as staff development and office space utilisation.  
 Much more important in our thinking, however, is the proposition that size 
allows for the development of the specialised legal expertise and breadth of 
experience amongst specialists necessary to achieve a degree of monopoly in the most 
lucrative segments of the market for legal services. Closely related here is the 
proposition that size alone confers prestige. Scale of operations is, after all, often 
treated as evidence of quality, and will allow legal firms to operate on a somewhat 
equal footing to the largest of their corporate clients. This sort of observation is 
particularly relevant when it is recalled that the most lucrative areas of legal services 
are in corporate and commercial law.  Indeed, many corporate and financial areas 
require the capacity to provide multi-disciplinary teams and a global presence. For 
these activities, a large critical mass of legal expertise is a requirement (Flood, 1989; 
Lee, 1992; Flood, 1996; Sommerland, 1995; PWC, 2000; SRU, 2002).  However, 
none of these things necessarily require increased management per se to deliver them. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the recognition that these benefits will flow from an 
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increased scale of operations is the reason (especially at the outset) for their eventual 
realisation. 
 
(b)  The Inner Mechanism of Change 
 
Observations of the sort made above, however, encourage the view that, whether it is 
augmented by the development of management or not, growth in the size of solicitor 
firms is mainly motivated by the goal of securing improved efficiency.  On the other 
hand, it is also true that increases in the scale of operations are essential if firms wish 
to enter and effectively defend their presence in lucrative areas of the market for legal 
services.  Also, an in our thinking significantly, increases in the scale operations 
constitute a way of defending the high levels of remuneration that senior solicitors 
have traditionally enjoyed. Clearly, features of contemporary reorganisation, 
especially increases in scale, reward the equity partners within solicitor firms much 
more generously than salaried solicitors and other employees, and this is true whether 
the surpluses generated increase overall or not.  It is therefore open to argument 
whether the increased efficiency of large firms is mainly a cause or a consequence of 
the pursuit of larger scale organisation. 
 The re-organisation of the division of labour within solicitor firms we have 
examined, clearly has the effect, whatever else it does, of disproportionately 
enhancing the rewards accruing to equity partners, and this seems a likely to be an 
important cause of changes in the strategy of this group, which also leads to 
increasing scale of operations. Equity partners share profits, whilst other fee earners 
receive a fixed salary. Under almost all circumstances the revenues generated by each 
associate or salaried partner out-weigh the cost of their labour.  In 1988 Abel (Abel 
1988) suggested that the average associate generates between 2.5 and 4.8 times as 
much income as his or her cost in salary.  Hence, other things equal, in the process of 
employing a higher proportion of salaried solicitors, an increasingly large surplus is 
generated.  In 1993, it was estimated that, in medium-sized but well-leveraged 
partnership, up to 60% of partner profit is generated in this way (Maister, 1993).  
Thus, one obvious consequence of the type of reorganisation that has been considered 
in the first part of this paper is that partners secure clear (and disproportionately large) 
financial benefits from increasing the numbers of associate solicitors and limiting the 
numbers of equity partners. To put it crudely, the changes we have been examining 
 17
increase the number of the people who bake the cake (fee earners) whilst, at the same 
time, stabilising or even reducing the number of those whose share of the cake 
increases in proportion to its size (equity partners). Larger rewards for partners follow 
the adjustments to the gearing ratios of equity partners to salaried partners and 
associate solicitors. By these means, partners are able not only to safeguard their 
income levels, but also to enhance them whatever the trading conditions (Lee 2000; 
Maister 1993). 
 
(c) The Consequences of Redrawn Closure Boundaries 
 
It should perhaps be borne in mind that there are real threats to the rewards 
accruing to solicitors, and so also to their status, at the present time.  In recent years 
there has been a weakening of the profession’s capacity to exercise external closure 
through the widening of access to legal training, as more and more university degree 
courses in law have been created. There have also been actions by government that 
have had the same tendency. Cuts in legal aid budgets and the weakening of solicitor 
monopolies in key areas of practice (such as conveyancing) are indicative. Against 
this background it can be argued that the reorganisation of solicitor firms represents 
the assertion of internal closure to compensate for the loss of external closure.  One 
account of what is happening is that partners are safeguarding their income levels by 
avoiding the consequences of the weakening of external closure by loading them onto 
subordinate groups within solicitor firms. This they do by enforcing stricter internal 
closure.  
In this account, associate and assistant solicitors are bearing many of the costs of 
changed arrangements for closure in terms of deteriorating promotion prospects and 
through the lengthening of the time typically required to obtain a partnership and 
toughening of the criteria through which solicitors obtain partnerships. The 
widespread introduction of “salaried partner” status for senior salaried solicitors can 
be related to the same trends. No doubt too, this change has resulted in the weakening 
of the terms and conditions of work of salaried solicitors, through rising competition 
between people in these positions, and the intensification of their work. Also 
noticeable is the development of a culture of presence and the increasing use of 
competitive selection.  However, all this is done without any frontal attack on the 
importance of qualified solicitor status for associates, as the ratio of qualified 
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members of the legal profession to other employees is increasing, as we have seen.  
There is not any tendency, as our data show, for the substitution of unqualified 
employees (legal executives or clerks) for qualified solicitors. Indeed, it seems very 
clear from the data that it is the non fee-earning staff, including any administrative 
workers, who have paid the highest price in terms of overall job security and career 
stability, in consequence of changing arrangements aimed at securing effective 
closure by equity partners. As discussed, it is this category of employees that is used 
by the profession as a disposable buffer to guarantee an element of headcount cost 
flexibility in adverse trading conditions.  
 In the ten years to 2000, the headcount growth of partners grew by 30%, while 
their salaried subordinates expanded by no less than 170%. In other words, associates 
have been growing over 5 times more rapidly than their profit sharing colleagues. 
This has meant the drastic lengthening of partner promotion times, which, once the 
new position of salaried partner is taken into account, have effectively doubled.  Abel 
calculated an average time of 5.5 years for a solicitor to become a partner in the mid 
80s (Abel 1988). An equivalent calculation for data available for the late 1990’s 
shows this period had increased to approximately 10 years. Implied here is a departure 
from the traditional criteria of seniority combined with technical competence as the 
main consideration in career progression. It seems evident that nowadays there is the 
prioritisation of new criteria such as commercial awareness and productivity. It is in 
this sort of context that we must consider the importance of management being 
recognisable, in that the ability of a prospective partner to manager salaried solicitors 
might be a qualification for promotion. However, such a suggestion is a long way 
from claiming that management is becoming a general function adopted by legal 
firms, because of its supposed contribution to efficiency, as is implied by archetype 
theorists (cf Hanlon 1997). The ultimate outcome of this approach to career 
progression is provided by the emergence of the ‘up or out’ culture, where solicitors 
who fail to make promotion are expected to leave, at great personal cost and 
regardless of their years of commitment and financial contribution (Lee 2000). 
 These trends may be facilitated by some gender considerations, such as the 
progressive feminisation of the legal profession. Today, whilst women represent the 
majority of salaried solicitors (approx 14000 female solicitors to 12000 males) only a 
quarter of partners are female. In this context, the tightening of internal closure 
regimes and the re-adjustment of professional leverage ratios may be tied to the 
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subordination of female professionals and to the emergence of a gendered division of 
labour (Sanderson and Sommerland 2000; Thomas 2000).   In other words, although 
further research is required, gender-based discrimination may be offering 
opportunities for redrawing closure, which are helping facilitate the reorganisation of 
the profession. 
 
(d) More Hierarchy Not More Management 
 
 As a result of these processes, today the solicitor branch of the legal profession 
is increasingly stratified in its structure, pyramidal in its configuration and reliant on a 
substantially hierarchical division of labour. Career paths have been formalised and 
generally elongated, whilst employment security, if the up-or-out practices are 
indicative, is declining. These developments are not apparently associated with 
processes of bureaucratisation, as might be expected.  However, these trends clearly 
have the effect of increasing leverage within the profession and, in the process, it has 
a clearly positive impact on partner profitability (Abel 1988, Maister 1993). The new 
opportunities presented by effective leveraging may also go some way towards 
explaining the remarkable processes of organisational consolidation experienced by 
the profession. Over the past 11 years, the total number of solicitor firms has 
increased by a modest 2%. During that time, the total number of partners has risen by 
12.5%, but the total number of solicitors has increased by 44%.  In particular, large 
and very large firms have expanded respectively by 55% and 120%.  
 Hence we argue that professional consolidation is linked to the attempts by 
partners, especially those controlling the larger organisations, to sustain profit margins 
through the increase of leverage ratios and through the extensive reorganisation of the 
professional labour process. However, this categorically does not involve the de-
professionalisation of solicitors, if by this is meant any attempt to dispense with 
professionally qualified workers as the basis of the delivery legal services. The ratio 
of partners to assistant solicitors has always been low, and despite the growth in 
solicitor numbers overall, these ratios have not much changed. In small firms, in 
recent decades the ratio has not exceeded parity, with an average of less than one 
assistant to each partner.  Amongst the largest firms, even today, the ratio is only 
approaching 1 to 2, with two salaried solicitors to each partner. Hence, we argue that 
these changes are best thought of as marginal changes in the internal configuration of 
professional organisations.  
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 We argue that the current transformation of the legal profession, is not 
explained by the identification and adoption of a better and more effective 
organisational paradigm, nor by the introduction of management to professional 
domains in any concerted way. Such developments of managerialism as there are, and 
of which there is some evidence in recent research, is best explained by (a) the need to 
enhance the coordination of larger firms engaged in more activities and (b) the need to 
introduce more rational and predictable accounting and practices associated with the 
increased routinisation of the work of employees, including salaried solicitors.  
However the scope for this is limited and is clearly subordinated to the interests and 
policies of the elite of professionals (the equity partners) who continue to control 
firms of solicitors.   
 
(e)  Some General Implications of the Analysis 
 
This analysis rejects interpretations of the legal profession that emphasise 
commercialisation, managerialisation and archetypal transformation.  It stresses 
instead the continuity, which we suggest characterises change in the organisation of 
the legal profession. Quantitative data analysed in this paper point to the robust 
resilience and solidity of professional arrangements and practices. The profession may 
be increasingly attentive to its own management but this is a by-product of the 
reorganisation of the profession, itself undertaken by the professional elites in pursuit 
of their own advantage. There is little evidence here of the development of an 
autonomous managerial cadre.  On the contrary, there is every indication that the elite 
of the profession continues to retain ultimate control over its own work and division 
of labour within professional firms. In other words, senior solicitors continue to retain 
a solid grip on their own organisations, and, any managerial functionaries they 
employ are subordinated to their interests and occupationally defined objectives.  
Because solicitors continue to be in charge of solicitor firms, continuity rather than 
fundamental change is the prominent tendency in the reorganisation of the legal 
profession.  
The argument of this paper is to reassert the value of the concept of the 
professional project as the basis of a persuasive explanation of recent change. More 
specifically, it is argued here that the current development of the legal profession 
should be understood in the context of the continuation of the long-term strategies and 
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historical objectives associated with the professional project. The concept of the 
professional project suggests that professions, as social collectivities, adopt strategies 
designed to improve their occupational and financial position through processes of 
collective action and mobilization. These efforts involve the attempt to translate one 
set of scarce technical and cultural resources into an institutionalised system of 
rewards. This has historically included a wide range of tactical initiatives but it has 
traditionally prioritised the institution of effective closure regimes. Closure guarantees 
‘the creation of artificial scarcity, by means of which the theoretically inexhaustible 
knowledge resource becomes socially finite’ (Larson 1977: 223). Traditionally, the 
achievement and maintenance of effective closure has guaranteed a profession’s 
financial privileges and explained its success. In the case of the contemporary legal 
profession, we have a particular example of the reworking of closure. This reworking 
is in response to external threats, and in the face of increasing opportunities for 
professional fee earning only within limited enclaves of professional practice. 
In the last 20 years or so, professional institutions, practices and values have 
been exposed to sustained criticism. In particular, the emergence of a neo-liberal 
governmental agenda has brought with it attacks on the structural practices and the 
ideological scaffolding which underpin professionalism as a distinct work-
organisation principle (Burrage 1992; Halliday and Karpick 1997; Kirkpatrick and 
Lucio 1995; Reed 2000). In this context, the legal profession has been exposed to a 
process of economic liberalization and cultural demystification. Today, in many ways 
solicitors operate in a more hostile environment and the legal profession is 
increasingly an embattled occupation.  
Traditional tactics, structures and modes of operation have not entirely lost 
their efficacy but monopoly and closure, traditionally the twin pillars of professional 
success, have been attacked and partially dismantled. In this context, the professional 
project has required, in order to deliver on its long-term objectives, some tactical 
adjustments. This process has involved, inter alia, the use of some of the exploitative 
tactics associated with management in commercial and industrial settings. But this is 
not to be confused with professionalism, as a work-organisation principle, being 
supplanted by a managerial one. In the case of the English legal profession, the 
dominant elite is pursuing profitability and continued occupational success through 
new methods which prioritise new lines of internal closure. These may also be 
associated with more active management of other staff in solicitor firms, but this 
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augments rather than replaces professional power. It does not imply any loss of 
professional control. On the contrary, these developments are ultimately introduced 
by professional elites for their own direct benefit; they are the result of partners’ 
agency powers.  
Finally, we argue that our data conform to Freidson’s (2001) “stratification 
hypothesis”, according to which professional occupations will become increasingly 
polarised between, on the one hand, rank and file workers (who engage in routine 
activities and are increasingly exposed to market pressures and management), and, on 
the other hand, a professional elite (which has secured a tight grip on all the 
prestigious executive and controlling positions within the professional associations 
and the leading practices). (See also Abel 1988; Freidson 1994). The former are 
concerned with day to day routine problems while the latter face completely different 
experiences and concerns such as strategic planning, operational control, and 
organisational / occupational development. Their occupational conditions and 
prospects are also extremely different.  While, for the former, professional activity 
means salaried and increasingly supervised work in a bureaucratic and hierarchical 
organisation or entrepreneurial competition in an insecure market, the latter, on the 
other hand, share profits, retain most of their power and prestige and continue to live 
by the rules of professional etiquette (Abel 1988; Freidson 1994; Freidson 2001).  
According to this argument, in time, such tendencies may even lead to the emergence 
of a two-tier professionalism, where a small core of highly trained practitioners 
engages in the more complex and specialised tasks, leaving routine matters to a 
rapidly expanding cohort and less qualified (and much more poorly paid) professional 
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